What's (Not) Validating Network Paths: A Survey by Bu, Kai et al.
1What’s (Not) Validating Network Paths: A Survey
KAI BU and YUTIAN YANG, Zhejiang University
AVERY LAIRD, Simon Fraser University
JIAQING LUO, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
YINGJIU LI, Singapore Management University
KUI REN, Zhejiang University
Validating network paths taken by packets is critical for a secure Internet architecture. Any feasible solution
must both enforce packet forwarding along endhost-specified paths and verify whether packets have taken
those paths. However, neither enforcement nor verification is supported by the current Internet. Due likely to
a long-standing confusion between routing and forwarding, only limited solutions for path validation exist in
the literature. This survey article aims to reinvigorate research in to the significant and essential topic of path
validation. It crystallizes not only how path validation works but also where seemingly qualified solutions fall
short. The analyses explore future research directions in path validation toward improving security, privacy,
and efficiency.
CCS Concepts: • Networks→ Network architectures; Network protocols; Network security; • Security and
privacy→ Cryptography; Network security;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Future Internet architecture, packet forwarding, path validation, authenti-
cation
ACM Reference format:
Kai Bu, Yutian Yang, Avery Laird, Jiaqing Luo, Yingjiu Li, and Kui Ren. 2018. What’s (Not) Validating
Network Paths: A Survey. ACM Comput. Surv. XX, YY, Article 1 (January 2018), 30 pages.
https://doi.org/0000001.0000001
1 INTRODUCTION
“To remember where you come from is part of where you’re going.”
— Anthony Burgess
Validating network paths is indispensable for a secure Internet architecture [5, 11, 29]. Unlike the
current Internet, where routers have full control over packet delivery, path validation empowers
end hosts with more control. It enables end hosts to enforce the paths they would prefer their
packets to follow. End hosts can also verify whether these paths are really followed. Clearly, any
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feasible path validation solution would modify packet processing logic on routers. This makes path
validation still transcendental for future Internet architectures [11]. Then one may wonder: Why
bother with the so caused remanufacture efforts? We can already enjoy diversified high quality
Internet services anyway. The transparency of underlying packet delivery, however, necessitates
path validation. Imagine a supposed life-saving call to 911 that gets answered a bit late or even
fails to get through. Should the unfortunate caller attribute his or her unluckiness to the slow
Internet backbone [14] for not processing his or her call more quickly? Or should the caller question
whether the call is directed along a slower path that is not intended for critical services like 911?
This concern is confirmed a decade ago—Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may sometimes transit
each other’s traffic for profits [91]. In particular, the ISP you signed up with may direct your traffic
to other ISPs with inferior performance. However, the current Internet provides no means for users
to enforce and verify packet delivery. Such a deficiency might be exploited for security breaches
over, for example, financial, medical, and military services built on the Internet [9]. To mitigate this
security issue, the Internet community advocates validating network paths by enforcing where
packets should visit and verifying where packets have transited. With path validation, we expect
to make packet delivery more reliable and robust.
Path validation is not the first to tackle the insecurity of the current Internet, but it is the most
robust. The first to rally against an insecure Internet is secure routing [44]. It aims to find the
best (e.g., shortest) paths connecting end hosts without the path finding process being attacked.
However, finding a best path does not necessarily mean that packet delivery strictly follows the
best path. Under the control of attackers, compromised routers may discard or detour packets.
To improve forwarding reliability, source routing embeds path directives in packet headers [35].
A path directive is a sequence of routers that should be visited, in order, by the corresponding
packet. Traceroute [68] enables end hosts to retrieve the path taken by packets. Only with sufficient
cryptography augmentation, secure source routing [9] and secure traceroute [60] can enforce
and verify network paths, respectively, without being vulnerable to forging and tampering. Both
solutions, however, are not designed with each other taken into account. This makes them hard to
operate concurrently. It is also infeasible or inefficient to simply combine them for path validation.
This paper presents the first comprehensive survey of path validation. Simply put, path validation
functions by embedding cryptographic states computed over path metadata in packet headers
[58]. Such packet-carried states are initialized by the source and force enroute routers to forward
packets along the source-specified path. Moreover, they are updated on enrouter routers, enabling
downstream routers and the destination to verify path compliance. Clearly, path validation increases
packet size and thus imposes bandwidth overhead on a network. This overhead, however, is deemed
insignificant to plentiful network bandwidth [20]. The benefits in performance, reliability, and
security we gain from path validation far outweigh the additional bandwidth overhead. In spite of
the significance to advancing Internet technology, path validation has a surprisingly limited number
of solutions. We ascribe this rarity to a lack of systematic distinction among Internet enhancement
solutions: almost all of them claim reliable end-to-end communication as a goal. Without a deep
understanding of each solution, we may easily miss subtle yet essential differences that render a
solution unsuitable for path validation. This further motivates us to conduct this survey. When
identifying path validation solutions, we adhere to the strict requirement that path validation
should jointly achieve path enforcement and path verification [46]. Path validation design evolves
toward improving efficiency with reduced state size. Sporadic work [87] is dedicated to analyze the
security properties using formal security proofs. A variant also validates where packets should not
transit [48]. Inspired by the disparity of established efforts for path validation and the attention it
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should deserve, we also explore future research avenues toward enhancing efficiency, security, and
privacy.
It is challenging to conduct such a thorough and systematic survey, particularly when filtering
unqualified solutions and scrutinizing qualified ones. As aforementioned, many solutions may
state their design goals similar to that of path validation, only to fall short. Often, they either
refer to secure routing instead of forwarding [44], or partially solve path validation with only
one attempt of path enforcement [9] and path verification [60]. These unqualified solutions far
outnumber the qualified ones, making the classification process nebulous and difficult. Even for
path validation solutions that jointly enforce and verify network paths, we have to scrutinize certain
subtle differences therein. We find that later solutions do not gain efficiency for free, but rather at
the cost of security. This, however, can hardly be noticed without a systematic understanding of
path validation solutions.
We strive for crystallizing what works for path validation, what does not, and what is worth
pursuing. Table 1 classifies all solutions to be reviewed in this paper. We highlight our major
contributions as follows, with sincere hope that they may benefit academic researchers and industry
professionals with useful directions for validating network paths and therefore securing the Internet.
• Establish the motivation and requirements for path validation. This helps readers to better
understand the significance of path validation.
• Clarify the differences between path validation solutions and various other Internet en-
hancements such as secure routing, (secure) source routing, and (secure) traceroute. Only
after filtering unqualified solutions can we concentrate on how path validation works,
evolves, and limits.
• Scrutinize the principles and limitations of path validation solutions. We find that their
efficiency gains come at the expense of security. This subtle caveat can only be uncovered
thorough a systematic understanding of path validation solutions.
• Explore future research avenues and suggest feasible directions. Path validation has many
breakthroughs in efficiency, security, and privacy to come.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the path validation problem and
specifies solution requirements. Section 3 covers related work that is concerned with loose control
over network traffic but fails to validate their forwarding paths. Section 4 reviews path validation
solutions. Section 5 focuses on a variant of the path validation problem called alibi routing. Section 6
identifies open issues and future directions. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 PATH VALIDATION: WHAT ANDWHY
In this section, we present the motivation and requirements for validating network paths. The
current Internet focuses more on the process of finding routes or paths between Autonomous
Systems (ASes) [50]. However, the issues of how to enforce packet forwarding along a specified path,
and how to verify whether that path was really taken, are less explored. All network entities along
a path—the source, intermediate routers, and the destination—have motivations for enforcing and
verifying network paths (Section 2.2). When considering potential points of failure ranging from
external attackers to misbehaving internal network entities, it becomes clear that path enforcement
and verification are both essential prerequisites for a robust Internet. The solutions, referred to as
path validation [46], are indispensable for a secure Internet architecture.
2.1 Out of Source, Out of Control: Packet Forwarding under Internet’s StatusQuo
In the current Internet architecture, routers decide how to forward a packet toward its destination
[26]. A forwarding decision depends on a router’s local routing table. Each entry in the routing
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Table 1. Reference classification.
Category Reference Index Principle
Secure Routing1 S-BGP [44] §3.1.1 cryptographically secure
SPV [39] routing messages against
SCION [88] prefix hijacking, route
Lychev et al. [50] spoofing, and eavesdropping
Source Routing i3 [72] §3.1.2 embed plain-text path
DOA [77] directives in packet headers
NUTSS [34] to direct packet delivery
Dysco [86] on enroute routers
NIRA [83]
RBF [62]
Multipath Routing
[31, 35, 55, 84, 90]
Traceroute PPM [68] §3.1.3 mark router history
Efficient PPM [33, 71, 81] in packet headers,
DPM [22] or log packet history
Cherrypick [76] on routers,
SPIE [69] to retrieve taken paths
NetSight [37]
Hybrid Design
[25, 51, 52, 82]
Path Verification: Padmanabhan et al. [60] §3.2 cryptographically secure
secure traceroute Wong et al. [79] packet marks or logs
AudIt [7] against forging & tampering
RPVM [41]
SPP [23]
Path Enforcement: Platypus [63] §3.3 cryptographically secure
secure source routing Avramopoulos et al. [9] packet-carried path directives
Ethane [21] against forging & tampering
ARROW [61]
Onion Routing [75]
Tor [74]
HORNET [24]
Path Validation: PFRI [20] §4.1 embed cryptographic states
enforcement + verification ICING [58] §4.2 in packet headers;
OPT [46] §4.3 states enforce specified paths;
OSV [18, 19] §4.4 routers update states toward
Alibi Routing [48] §5 verifying path compliance
Notes:
1. We list only typical secure routing solutions. More are reviewed in [3, 17, 38, 40, 50, 59].
table associates a reachable destination with a next hop router along the path to the destination.
An entry may also contain fields like path cost and quality of service that drive path selection.
Routing tables can be configured either manually or dynamically. Manual configuration requires
that a network administrator calculate all paths for potential packets across the network. For each
path, the administrator needs to add a routing table entry on every router along the path. This task
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is manageable for small and static networks. However, it becomes challenging, tedious, and error
prone when networks are large or dynamic. Therefore, most routers adopt dynamic configuration
that uses routing protocols to automatically configure routing tables and update them upon network
changes. Routing protocols enable routers to propagate network topology such that any router
may locally determine a path. Routing protocols for an individual AS are referred to as Interior
Gateway Protocols (IGPs), while those for communicating different ASes are referred to as Exterior
Gateway Protocols (EGPs) [53]. The mainstream routing protocols currently in use are the Open
Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol [56, 57] for IGPs and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [64]
for EGPs. The software layer running routing protocols in modern router architectures is called
the control plane. It is the hardware layer, called the forwarding plane, that forwards packets in
line speed. To this end, routers need to compile routing tables in the control plane into forwarding
tables in the forwarding plane. The medium storing forwarding tables should support fast lookup.
Common such mediums in use are Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), Dynamic Random
Access Memory (DRAM), and Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM). The lookup process
usually follows the longest prefix match algorithm, which forwards a packet to the next hop based
on whichever routing table entry has the most leading-edge bits in common with the destination
address [65].
Once packets depart from the source, it has no control over how enroute routers may forward
packets. The destination is just as powerless; neither entity has the ability to enforce path prefer-
ences, that is, which path their packets should follow. Moreover, the lack of packet verification on
routers makes forwarding exploitable for many attacks. For example, since routers do not authen-
ticate packet sources, IP spoofing based DDoS attacks forge attacking packets’ source addresses,
which are hard to trace back [68]. Compromised routers can also arbitrarily tamper packet payloads
without detection by downstream routers.
While source authenticity and packet integrity can be verified based on end-to-end cryptographic
authentication, network paths taken by packets cannot be easily verified or enforced in the current
Internet. Verifying paths using either per-hop per-packet receipts to the source (e.g., traceroute [69])
or per-hop per-packet logs for query [23] incurs an impractically heavy overhead of communication
or storage. Enforcing paths is even harder: In the current Internet, packets carry an indication of
only where they should go (i.e., destination addresses in packet headers) without any packet-specific
preferences for intermediate routers. One may suggest that before sending packets, the source or
destination informs each enroute router of its preferred path, with packet identifiers and preferred
forwarding decisions. Then, upon receiving a packet, each router locally matches it against the
recorded packet identifiers and, once a match is found, follows the associated forwarding decision.
Again, this solution causes heavy communication and storage overhead to network channels and
elements. Besides the efficiency concern, a bigger challenge comes when compromised routers may
misbehave [46, 58].
2.2 My Packet, My Way: That’s when You Can’t Count on Current Internet
Before detailing the requirements and challenges for enforcing and verifying network paths, we
first explore their use cases. Certain demands must be met for all three types of entities along a
network path, that is, the source/sender, intermediate/enroute routers, and the destination/receiver.
Source’s demands. The source specifies path preferences mainly for guaranteeing quality of ser-
vice. Expected service quality is usually specified in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) agreed with
the service provider. For example, ISPs provide customers with multiple choices of network band-
width, such as 100 Mbps and 1 Gbps. Similarly, mobile carriers offer different wireless bandwidth
to customers through different cellular technologies, such as 3G and 4G. However, a misbehaving
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ISP/carrier may forward traffic via an inferior path rather than the premium one promised in the
SLA [41, 46]. Moreover, different ISPs may sometimes transit traffic between each other [91]. In
either case, a customer may experience degraded service quality due to path noncompliance.
The source may also specify path preferences for additional security and privacy. It is common
that certain regions deploy censorship systems to inspect and filter Internet traffic. When the
source in a region sends packets to the destination in another region, the packets may transit a
series of intermediate regions. If there are multiple feasible paths transiting different sequences
of intermediate regions, the source likely wishes to choose one without censorship. This is more
challenging to address because we need to prove not only that a packet takes the chosen path,
but also that the packet does not take the unwanted path involving censorship [48]. The proof of
taking one path is unnecessarily equivalent to not taking any other path. For example, misbehaving
routers can simply process packets without adding required proofs to them [58].
Destination’s demands. The receiver specifies path preferences for incoming packets mainly
for service chaining [58]. Specifically, the receiver may require incoming packets go through
services like accounting, inspection, and load balancing. Different service chaining may direct
packets through different paths. This requires adapting the Internet to multipath routing [43],
which provides two end hosts with multiple path choices instead of a single best path (e.g., the
shortest one [70]).
Intermediate router’s demands. It would seem that intermediate routers have less incentive to
accommodate path preferences of end hosts. However, the ability of intermediate routers to satisfy
path preferences has a direct impact on the end host’s perceived service quality. If service quality
is not satisfactory, it will discourage end hosts from continuing their subscription and therefore
reduce profits for the service provider. Once intermediate routers cooperate with end hosts, they
should collaboratively detect deviated packets as early as possible [46]. Tolerating deviated packets
may waste network resources, impair service quality, expose the source’s privacy, and jeopardize
the destination’s security.
2.3 Path Validation = Path Enforcement + Path Verification
The path validation problem is introduced to enforce and verify network paths. Kim et al. [46]
define the goal of path validation as follows.
“The Goal of Path Validation [46]: The source, intermediate routers, and the
destination should be able to validate that the packet indeed traversed the path
known to (or selected by) the source. Successful path validation ensures that the
packet traversed each honest router on the path in the correct order.”
To achieve this goal, a path validation solution should feature two functionalities. First, it should
enable the source and intermediate routers to enforce mutually agreed upon path preferences.
Second, it should also allow the destination and intermediate routers to verify path compliance. The
design key is to provide two packet-path bindings. One binding is between a packet and the path it
should take. This enables path enforcement, as the binding specifies where to forward the packet.
The other binding is between the packet and the path it really takes. This enables path verification
as the binding verifies whether the taken path is exactly the specified one. If the verification passes,
path validation succeeds.
Path validation solutions use packet-carried states. The fundamental premise of packet-carried
states is that bandwidth is plentiful [58]. But it is still important to limit state size such that
bandwidth consumption is economized. Specifically, in the case of path validation, the states are
initialized by the source and are included in expanded packet headers. The states should include
the information of specified paths such that intermediate routers can verify whether they pertain
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to a correct path, and determine where to correctly forward a packet. An intermediate router need
also verify whether a packet went through upstream routers in the correct order. To this end, each
intermediate router should leave its mark in the states to prove this to both downstream routers
and its destination. The source, intermediate routers, and the destination should all use mutually
exchanged shared secrets (e.g., keys) to update and verify states.
Various design challenges arise from the requirement that path validation should function
properly in an adversarial, decentralized, and high-speed environment [58]. Path validation may
be employed by all three types of network entities (i.e., the source, intermediate routers, and the
destination) for purposes of improved service quality, security, and privacy. It is certainly wise to
presume the existence of external attackers or even internal misbehaving entities. Such adversaries
aim to allow packets that have not taken the specified path to still pass path verification. Path
verification should be decentralized so that intermediate routers and the destination can locally
verify path compliance. By not transiting packets and their paths’ metadata to a centralized server,
decentralized path verification avoids corresponding transition delay. Furthermore, it avoids the
single point of failure that the centralized server may otherwise encounter. However, limiting the
delay induced by processing packet states beyond high-speed forwarding is still a major challenge.
For Internet companies, a few milliseconds of delay would turn to a profit decrease of millions of
dollars [14].
Clearly, routers need to be upgraded to support path validation using packet-carried states with
the above challenges addressed. The upgrade is necessary for both hardware (e.g., for cryptographic
computation) and software (e.g., for processing states). This is why path validation solutions still
have not been deployed, and remain transcendental for future secure Internet architectures [11].
One question to ask is whether we really have to change router architectures for path validation. If
the answer is yes, to what extent do we need to change the current Internet? Researchers on path
validation, of course, are not the first to concern themselves with uncontrollable forwarding. How
did other peer researchers tackle this problem? Can they achieve path validation, even without
modifying Internet protocols? Before discussing path validation solutions in Section 4, let us first
review various related solutions and analyze where they fall short for validating network paths in
Section 3.
3 THE ROAD TO PATH VALIDATION
In this section, we review seemingly qualified solutions and examine where they fall short of path
validation. While most of them claim to achieve similar goals as that of path validation, they cannot
achieve both path enforcement and path verification, which is the key to path validation. The
unqualified solutions far outnumber the qualified ones to be reviewed in Section 4, making the
classification process nebulous and challenging. This, however, further inspires us to conduct this
thorough and systematic survey of what works for path validation, what does not, and what is
worth pursuing.
• We start with secure routing, which secures the process of finding feasible paths between
end hosts (Section 3.1.1). Secure routing can be easily confused with path validation as its
solutions usually claim secure end-to-end communication as the goal. However, routing
plays only a partial role in the communication process. It is forwarding that decides
whether packets are delivered in accordance with routing policies. Forwarding decisions
are congruent with routing policies only when there exist no faulty or malicious routers.
• To gain more control over the forwarding process, non-security–based solutions like
source routing (Section 3.1.2) and traceroute (Section 3.1.3) augment packet delivery with
operations for enforcing and verifying paths. Specifically, source routing adds a path
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directive in packet headers to direct enroute routers on where to forward packets. On the
other hand, traceroute requires routers to log packet histories or mark packet headers with
visiting histories. Such historical information enables end hosts to reconstruct the path
taken by packets and therefore evaluate the compliance with forwarding requirements.
However, these solutions focus more on effectiveness rather than security. Both path
directives and packet/router histories are not cryptographically secured. This renders them
vulnerable to forging and tampering.
• Cryptographic enhancements are then introduced toward secure traceroute (Section 3.2)
and secure source routing (Section 3.3), respectively. Secure traceroute can achieve path
verification while secure source routing can achieve path enforcement. However, they are
not designed to operate concurrently. In other words, it is infeasible or inefficient to simply
integrate them for path validation.
3.1 What’s (Definitely) Not Path Validation
We start with non-security–based solutions that 1) secure routing instead of forwarding (Sec-
tion 3.1.1), 2) improve forwarding flexibility and robustness instead of security (Section 3.1.2), and
3) support forwarding diagnosis with tamperable traceroute (Section 3.1.3).
3.1.1 Secure Routing. For researchers new to path validation, they might easily confuse it with
secure routing. Secure routing protocols aim to protect the path finding process against various
attacks like prefix hijacking, route spoofing, and eavesdropping [17, 38]. In other words, the ultimate
goal of secure routing is to guarantee that any computed route is the best and authentic choice
generated by the routing protocol in use [50]. This may elicit an illusion that secure routing promises
secure end-to-end communication. However, the caveat is that routing refers to only the process of
finding routes; whether packets are forwarded along their associated routes are beyond the scope
of routing. Secure routing protocols alone are not sufficient. Via a compromised router, an attacker
can still drop, tamper, or arbitrarily forward packets. Therefore, securing the forwarding process
(e.g., by path validation) is crucial for secure communication [78].
To re-enforce the difference between secure routing and path validation, we review typical
solutions that represent the evolution of secure routing. S-BGP [44] stands out among the first
wave of routing security solutions. It adopts cryptography to authenticate destination addresses
and route announcements. Specifically, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) couples each AS with a
public/private key pair. The private key is for an AS to sign its announcements and the public key
is for other ASes to authenticate signed announcements. The PKI generates an AS’s keys based on
its IP address. This way, an AS cannot announce a false IP address and prevents prefix hijacking.
Moreover, since an AS does not know the private keys of other ASes, it cannot tamper with route
announcements. Follow-up solutions strive to improve S-BGP’s efficiency. For example, Secure Path
Vector (SPV) [39] adopts the HORS signature [67], which can be computed completely by symmetric
cryptography primitives, instead of asymmetric (as required by S-BGP). The evaluation results of
SPV demonstrate a 22-time speedup over S-BGP. To alleviate the overhead for a centralized PKI,
SCION [88] divides the entire network into a number of trust domains comprising core ASes and
normal ASes. Each trust domain locally maintains path query service. Communication between
different trust domains relies on core ASes. Most typical secure routing solutions targeting the
current Internet emerged before 2010. Subsequent research focus has shifted to evaluating their
deployment feasibility and practical effectiveness [50]. We refer interested readers to comprehensive
surveys on secure routing for more specifics [3, 17, 38, 40, 50, 59]. We emphasize to the reader
that constructing paths during routing and enforcing those paths during forwarding are two very
different tasks.
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3.1.2 Sourcing Routing. Source routing embeds the information of source-chosen paths (i.e.,
path directive) in packet headers to direct routing decisions on enroute routers [35]. The idea was
originally adopted by the Internet Protocol but not widely used [6]. It has regained the attention
of researchers as more control over packet delivery has been considered necessary [6, 35, 78, 83].
Source routing solutions focus mainly on robustness against link failures and flexibility for policy
enforcement. However, they do not consider security to be a design goal. In other words, source
routing assumes that routers are benign and faithfully follow path directives to forward packets.
Consequently, path directives appear in plaintext. Once routers are compromised, they may violate
source routing (e.g., by tampering path directives) without detection. Path validation, on the other
hand, considers compromised routers as a possible threat to forwarding, and takes precautions
against them.
Although being insufficient for path validation, source routing can greatly improve forwarding
flexibility and robustness. It may be used to ease policy enforcement [34, 62, 72, 77, 83, 86]. For
example, Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3) [72] enables a source to specify a chain of services
in a packet header. Specifically, each destination providing a certain service is assigned a unique ID.
A source specifies a chain of IDs in a packet header and sends the packet to a server. The server then
pushes the packet to destinations upon receiving their requests. Similarly, Delegation-Oriented
Architecture (DOA) [77], NUTSS [34], and Dysco [86] specify the sequence of middleboxes a packet
needs to traverse. NIRA [83] reduces the size of path encoding, while Rule-Based Forwarding (RBF)
[62] lets destinations specify the path for packets from a certain source. Source routing can also
be applied to multipath routing for a more robust solution [55]. Multipath routing broadens path
selection from a single best path, by allowing multiple paths between end hosts. The forwarding
process can quickly switch to another path once a link failure occurs, without suffering from the
delay caused by path re-computation [47]. Typical multipath routing solutions [31, 35, 55, 84, 90]
use source routing in a similar way but differ from each other in how paths between end hosts
are found. For example, one may simply calculate two disjoint paths between endpoints [90]. One
may also specify multiple next hops for each destination on each intermediate router [55]. Similar
to routing deflection [84], the source inserts indicator bits in the packet header to direct each
hop which next hop to forward the packet to. To reduce the size of routing tables, Pathlet [31]
proposes dividing a path into fragments called pathlets. Each router then maintains routing tables
with terminal routers of its residing pathlets as destinations. The source inserts IDs of the chosen
pathlets in the packet header to specify the entire path.
3.1.3 Traceroute. Traceroute (also known as traceback) is another technique that may easily
be confused with path validation. The key idea of traceroute is to enable routers to track traffic
history, either by directly marking packet headers [68], or by locally logging packet metadata [69].
Then the destination/receiver can use in-packet router marks, or query packet metadata from one
previous-hop router after another, to find out the path taken by received packets. Traceroute was
originally proposed to detect IP spoofing and related DDoS attacks [69, 85]. It seems that we can
also employ traceroute to assist in path validation. For example, we first let the destination know
the specified path for a packet. After receiving the packet, the destination can obtain its taken path
via traceroute. The destination then compares the taken path with the specified path. If they match,
the packet may have followed the specified path; otherwise, the forwarding process deviates from
source-destination agreement. Such a naive application of traceroute, however, fails to meet the
requirements for path validation defined in Section 2.3. First, traceroute does not regulate which
path a packet should take. Therefore, it does not embed any path directive in packet headers; this
fails the requirement of path enforcement. Second, both in-packet marks and on-router logs are
not cryptographically secured, making them vulnerable to forging and tampering—particularly
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if some routers are compromised. Path validation, on the other hand, can effectively combat the
impact of compromised routers on packet forwarding.
Most traceroute solutions use packet marking, packet logging, or both. All such methods require
modifications to router software. Packet marking requires routers to mark their information (e.g.,
identifiers) in the headers of passing packets. Due to the large volume of network traffic, Probabilistic
Packet Marking (PPM) proposes that each router marks a packet with a pre-defined probability
[68]. It is highly likely that each packet carries the information of only some enroute routers.
Therefore, a sufficient number of marked packets are needed to reconstruct the path between the
source and the destination. Follow-up work [33, 71, 81] strives for improving efficiency, particularly
in reducing the number of marked packets. At the other extreme, Deterministic Packet Marking
(DPM) requires each router to mark every packet [22, 76]. A single marked packet would suffice
for retrieving its taken path. DPM controls packet-header size by compressing router marks in a
Bloom Filter [15]. Without touching packets, packet logging enables each router to locally store
a digest of every passing packet [69]. The destination can use a single query packet to retrieve
packet digests on corresponding routers and reconstruct paths accordingly. Again, Bloom Filters
are used to improve storage efficiency. Leveraging the centralized management promised by SDN,
NetSight moves packet logs from forwarding devices to centralized servers [37]. It greatly reduces
storage overhead on forwarding devices and eliminates false positives caused by Bloom Filters.
Packet logging and packet marking are also jointly adopted in some hybrid designs [25, 51, 52, 82]
to reap the benefits of both worlds.
3.2 What’s One Step Closer: Path Verification
Path verification enables the destination to retrieve paths taken by packets and verify their authen-
ticity [23, 60]. Its essential idea is secure traceroute. Different from conventional traceroute solutions
(Section 3.1.3), secure traceroute uses cryptography to secure the metadata involved in retrieving
packet trajectories. Once the actual paths taken by packets deviate from the expected ones, path
verification may also help detect the faulty or compromised routers on which path deviation occurs.
This, however, does not mean that all solutions for detecting faulty or compromised routers (e.g.,
[10, 32]) are capable of path verification. Since path verification solutions do not enforce paths,
they fail to achieve path validation.
Typical secure traceroute requires that the source probe enroute routers hop by hop, prompting
each router to respond with a MAC-protected address of its next hop [60]. With such responses,
the source can reconstruct the path taken by probe packets. However, compromised routers may
faithfully respond to probe packets yet maliciously discard or detour production packets. It is then
necessary for secure traceroute to make probe packets indistinguishable from production packets.
The solution in [60] requires a secret channel for the source to synchronize indicators for probe
packets with each router. Then the source embeds such indicators in the headers of probe packets.
For computing the MACs of next-hop routers’ addresses, the source should establish a key pair
with each router. To ease deployment, the solution in [79] removes the use of the secret channel
and pre-established key pairs. Specifically, it requires the source and each router to share secrets
offline before probing. The source directly embeds such secrets in production packets. Each router
locally stores the secrets, and based on them, follows simple match-forward to respond to the
source, without heavy cryptographic computation. Clearly, probe-based path verification cannot
perform at a per-packet granularity; one response from each router to the source per packet would
induce significantly high overhead.
Another line of research achieves path verification by analyzing how an aggregate of packets
interacts with routers. This method is originally proposed to detect packet loss and delay. Instead
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of triggering a response to the source upon arrival of individual probe or production packets,
each router responds to the source with statistics like volume and timing after receiving a certain
number of packets. For example, AudIt [7] requires that a response contain how many packets from
the source are received, from which previous hop they were received and at what time. Based on
responses from a series of routers, the source reconstructs the path taken by the aggregate of packets.
Statistics in responses also helps the source to detect packet loss and delays. AudIt does not use
cryptography to protect the integrity of responses. Instead, it leverages legally binding SLAs among
ISP peers. SLAs restrict an ISP from manipulating their peers’ packets. To further hinder response
manipulation, RPVM [41] varies the distribution of packet count by dividing the transmission time
into a number of time slots. Specifically, assume that sending out N packets takes the sourceT units
of time. Then source first divides T into K time slots, each with duration of t0, t1...ti ...tK−1 where
we have
∑
0≤i≤K−1 ti = T . By varying the length of each duration, the number ni of packets in the
slot with duration ti may have a different number of packets to send. The source timestamps each
packet upon sending it out; each router uses timestamps to cluster packets belonging to the same
time slot. Then each router should send its monitored distribution of packet count among time slots
to the source. Using the received statistics, the source reconstructs the path taken by the packets
and notices to which router packet loss or delay might have occurred. Although promising higher
efficiency than the probe-based solutions, the lack of cryptographic enhancements renders the
statistics-based solutions vulnerable to attacks. For example, we observe a replacement attack for
malicious routers to drop packets yet evade detection. To launch a replacement attack, a malicious
router simply drops some packets and injects an equal number of attack packets.
To attempt unforgeable packet-level history, Secure Packet Provenance (SPP) [23] maintains a
cryptographically secured history per packet on each router. SPP is inspired by a network forensic
tool called Secure Network Provenance (SNP) [89], which securely records network events and
causal links among them. In SPP, packet related events are represented by which router sends
which packet via which port at what time. The log of packet events is tamper-evident using the
PeerReview log system [36]. The source, the destination, or any intermediate router can query
packet histories from a certain router. The routers that respond to the query constitute the path
taken by the packet. Their order can be determined via the timings in the log.
3.3 What’s Almost There: Path Enforcement
We end this section with path enforcement solutions that further pave the road to path validation.
Path enforcement is built on top of secure source routing, which is easily confused with secure
routing (Section 3.1.1) and source routing (Section 3.1.2). Secure source routing differs from secure
routing in that the former protects the forwarding process while the latter protects the routing
process. It differs from source routing in that it focuses more on security and makes in-packet path
directives hard to forge or tamper. Clearly, path enforcement requires cryptography to secure path
directives carried in packet headers [9]. It, however, does not require enroute routers to embed
verifiable proofs in packet headers. Upon receiving a packet, downstream routers and the destination
have no means to verify the actual path taken by the packet. This lack of path verification renders
path enforcement alone insufficient for path validation.
Path enforcement needs to prevent forwarding policies specified by in-packet path directives
from circumvention. To this end, Platypus [63] introduces the concept and implementation of
network capabilities. One of the key components in a capability is a waypoint, which specifies a
must-visit transit point required by the source. When all routers on the specified path are designated
as waypoints, Platypus promises path enforcement. Achieving this goal requires that capabilities be
cryptographically hardened against tampering. Platypus introduces bindings to ensure capability
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validity. Specifically, a binding is a cryptographic function of a capability, packet content, and a
secret key held by the source of the packet [63]. Waypoints use bindings to verify whether the
source has the correct credential for requesting the given service specified in a capability. In other
words, routers use capabilities to direct packets, and use bindings to verify the integrity of capacities.
This ensures that packets are forwarded along their designated paths. Avramopoulos et al. [9]
improve robustness by introducing receipt acknowledgements and fault announcements. Receipt
acknowledgements enable each intermediate router and the destination to signal the receipt of a
packet, both to upstream routers and to the source. Fault announcements enable every intermediate
router to alert both upstream routers and the source when it fails to receive acknowledgements from
its downstream router. Once the source receives a fault announcement, it chooses a different path.
Ethane [21] applies the idea of path enforcement to enforcing traffic management policies in an
intranet. Advertised Reliable Routing over Waypoints (ARROW) [61] further advances incremental
deployability, high availability, and high robustness. Taking communication anonymity into account,
HORNET [24] integrates the ideas of Platypus [63] and Onion Routing [74, 75]. It encrypts not
only path metatdata in packet headers but also packet payloads. Each router can extract from an
encrypted packet only its previous hop and next hop. This achieves path enforcement yet reveals
no more path information than what is necessary for correct forwarding.
4 FINALLY, PATH VALIDATION: PATH ENFORCEMENT + PATH VERIFICATION
In this section, we review path validation protocols that not only enforce source/destination-chosen
paths but also verify whether the paths are really taken by packets. To our surprise, after excluding
the inapplicable solutions in Section 3, there are only a limited number of path validation solutions.
We suspect that this rarity might be mainly due to a common confusion between routing and
forwarding. As previously mentioned, most solutions for protecting the routing process claim
that they can promise secure end-to-end communication. Such a claim holds upon an implicit
assumption that once the best choice of path selection is generated, network entities will faithfully
direct corresponding packets along the path. Without a vigilance for the difference between routing
and forwarding, readers may conceive secure packet delivery as a fully investigated topic and
thus few of them tend to work on it. Path validation, however, is an indispensable building block
for future secure Internet architectures. Our survey helps clarify the necessity of path validation,
provide researchers with a comprehensive understanding of current solutions, and explore future
research directions.
Path validation protocols build themselves on a fundamental premise that network bandwidth is
plentiful—incorporating required mechanisms in packet headers is more important than optimizing
so caused bandwidth consumption [20]. Their major goal is to jointly guarantee path enforcement
and verification. Path enforcement and path verification are achieved via embedding in packet
headers with path encodings and router proofs, respectively. These embedded data should be hard
to forge or tamper. Their size can be rather large, say hundreds of bytes.
• Since the first framework of path validation [20] (Section 4.1), subsequent solutions strive
for reducing the data size to embed and accelerate the computation over them [18, 19, 46, 58]
(Section 4.2-Section 4.4). We, however, find that the efficiency enhancements come at the
expense of security degradation.
• Although the design framework for path validation is set, the computation method is
a promising design space. For example, fast algebraic computation can sometimes be
equally effective and secure yet significantly more efficient than expensive cryptographic
computation [18, 19] (Section 4.4).
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Fig. 1. PFRI instance by rendering Figure 3 in [20]. End-host α in realm R1 sends a packet to end-channel d
in realm R4 with realms R2 and R3 providing transit service. The initial partial path is αyurtzd . Partial paths
connecting rt , tz, and zd will be locally decided in realms R2, R3, and R4, respectively.
• Formal security proofs for path validation protocols do not keep up with the pace of protocol
evolution. So far, only the protocols presented in [46] are validated by formal methods
[87]. Since path validation is indispensable for future secure Internet architectures, formal
security proofs would be critical for deployment of any solutions (Section 6.1).
• Current path validation protocols still limit in various aspects, such as security, privacy,
and efficiency. We in this section focus mainly on their principles and defer discussing their
limitations that drive future research directions to Section 6.
4.1 Rationale: PFRI
Postmodern Forwarding and Routing Infrastructure (PFRI) [20] is the first work to advocate that
enforcement and verification be jointly performed on network paths. It centers on a datagram
delivery service, pertaining to the larger clean-slate Postmodern Internet Architecture (PIA) [12].
In subsequent literature on path validation, only ICING [58], to our knowledge, identifies PFRI as a
predecessor. Most of the related work, however, refers to ICING as the first path validation protocol.
This is likely because PFRI provides only a relatively high level framework of how to design and
bootstrap a new network model, with many notable advances other than path validation. For
example, it adopts location-independent non-hierarchical identifiers to represent end-hosts. This
resolves the mobility constraint of location-dependent IP addressing. It further models a network
as a collection of realms. A realm consists of nodes (i.e., end-hosts and forwarding elements) and
channels (i.e., links between nodes). A sequence of channels from source to destination constitutes
a PFRI path. Successful forwarding along a PFRI path necessitates certain centralization [58] to
maintain, for example, mappings from identifiers and channels to realms.
PFRI validates the path traversed by a packet by introducing four additional fields over packet
headers—motivation, accountability, knobs, and dials [20]. The fields of motivation and knobs enforce
network paths while the fields of accountability and dials verify them. For path enforcement, the
motivation field carries a network path in the packet header as a forwarding directive. For example,
in Figure 1, node α in realm R1 has a packet destined for end-channel d . Node α first queries
its co-realm centralized service for the border channel (i.e., z) of the realm (i.e., R4) containing
d . Then α queries a higher-level centralized service for the transit realms (i.e., R2 and R3) and
corresponding inter-realm path (i.e., rtz). Using local knowledge of intra-realm topology, α selects
an interior path (i.e., yu) leading to the border channel r that connects the first transit realm R2.
So far, the initial partial path is constructed as αyurtzd ; it is partial in that the other partial paths
connecting rt , tz, and zd will be locally decided in realms R2, R3, and R4, respectively. Along with
the forwarding directive, the motivation field should also carry credentials to convince enroute
nodes to forward the packet [20]. Operations other than forwarding can be declared through the
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knobs field, where credentials are necessary as well. To verify that the path really is forwarded
along the path specified in the motivation field, each enroute node should provide a hard-to-forge
evidence of packet forwarding in the accountability field [20]. The dials field enriches the types of
packet handling to verify. For example, signed nonrepudiable timestamps on enroute nodes help
reason about delay.
How to configure the preceding four fields toward path validation, however, is not elaborated in
[20]. For example, how does the source compute credentials for enroute nodes? How do enroute
nodes compute signatures for the destination? How do all nodes on the path share keys? All these
questions may elicit practical concerns and design challenges, especially when mingled with how
to control the expansion of packet headers [58].
4.2 ICING
Pertaining to another future Internet architecture called NEBULA [5], ICING [58] is acknowledged
by most literature [18, 19, 46] as the first concrete design and implementation of path validation. It
reinforces the requirements for designing path validation protocols, that is, a path validation protocol
should function properly in an adversarial, decentralized, and high-speed environment (Section 2.3).
Two key design choices that make ICING efficient are aggregate message authentication codes
(MACs) [42] and self-certifying names [4, 54].
First, aggregate MACs reduce state length from quadratic to linear with respect to path length.
Consider when ICING enforces a path P that consists of n nodes as P = (N0,N1, ...,Ni , ...,Nn−1),
including sender N0, receiver Nn−1, and routers Ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2. For path verification, each
Ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 should verify whether a packet with P as its purported path has really been
processed by all its upstream nodes Nj for 0 ≤ j < i in the correct order. To this end, each Ni
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 should integrate into the packet a number (n − 1) − (i + 1) + 1 = n − i − 1 of
proofs, one for each of its downstream nodes Nk for i < k ≤ n − 1. ICING refers to such proofs as
Proofs of Provenance (PoPs), which are essentially MACs of the packet. Simply concatenating all
PoPs for each Ni ’s (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2) downstream nodes would make the number of PoPs as large as∑n−2
i=0 (n − 2) − i + 1 = n(n−1)2 = O(n2). By using aggregate MACs [42], ICING uses only n − 1 fields
for the preceding path P . Each field corresponds to the aggregate MACs/PoPs for Ni (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1)
to verify. Specifically, for all Ni ’s upstream nodes Nj (0 ≤ j ≤ i − 1), Nj XORs the MAC it computes
to the PoP field for Ni . This way, the number of PoP fields shrinks to n − 1 = O(n).
Second, ICING configures shared keys for each pair of nodes to compute/verify PoPs directly
using the self-certifying names of nodes [4, 54], without a central naming authority or PKI. To
generate non-forgeable PoPs, each pair of nodes should share one symmetric key of their own.
Exchanging all required pair-wise shared keys for n nodes would incur an O(n2) complexity when
using PKI. Adopting self-certifying names [4, 54], however, can remove the need of PKI and enable
a node to compute its shared key with another node on the fly. Specifically, a node locally computes
a public/private key pair. It then locally stores the private key and announces the public key to
other nodes; the public key will also function as the name of the node. All keys should be generated
in such a way that for any pair of nodes Ni and Nj , when Ni computes a key ki out of its private key
and Nj ’s public key while Nj computes another key kj out of its private key and Ni ’s public key, ki
and kj should be identical. Then ki and kj can be used by Ni and Nj as their shared key, respectively.
For Ni to prove to its downstream Nj that Ni has processed a packet, Ni computes MACi of the
packet using key ki and addsMACi in the packet header. Upon receiving the packet, Nj computes
MACj of the packet using key kj and then compares MACj with MACi . If MACj = MACi , Nj
successfully verifies the history of Ni processing the packet.
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Fig. 2. ICING packet instance by rendering Figure 2 in [58].
Figure 2 illustrates how ICING enforces path validation over a packet along path P = (N0,N1,N2,N3).
N0 and N3 are the sender and receiver, respectively, while N1 and N2 are routers. How N0 finds path
P is the focus of routing, which is orthogonal to the forwarding process concerned with ICING [58].
Prior to sending packets along path P , N0 should first ask for consents from all the other nodes.
ICING refers to such consent as Proofs of Consents (PoCs). Ni (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) computes PoCi using the
node list in P and its private key. After obtaining all PoCs, sender N0 initializes the packet as follows.
First, it adds the node list of P in the packet header. For proving to Ni ∈ P (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) that all nodes
along path P give consent, N0 should also include obtained PoCs in the packet header. To prevent
an attacker from eavesdropping PoCs, N0 further obfuscates them using the content of the packet.
The obfuscation results are called authenticators Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). Each occupies a verifier field Vi
for Ni to verify. What N0 should further provide Ni to verify is PoPi . As illustrated in Figure 2(a),
PoPi is XORed to Vi , which is currently equal to Ai , using the aggregate MAC technique. N0 then
sends the packet to N1. N1 needs to verify only V1. The verification succeeds if two conditions are
satisfied. First, N1 has issued a PoC of path P to N0. Second, N0 has added in verifier V1 a PoP of
the packet. To verify the two conditions, N1 first computes the PoC and then the corresponding
authenticator A1. N1 then computes the PoP using the shared key with N0. After obtaining the two
values, N1 further compares their XOR result with the value of V1. If they are equal, the packet
passes verification and is then updated by N1 with its PoPs for N2 and N3 XORed to V2 and V3,
respectively (Figure 2(b)). N2 and N3 then similarly verify and update the packet. Only when the
packet visits every node on path P in order can it pass verification on every node.
We observe that the security level of ICING is bounded to one verifier instead of seemingly all
verifiers. This is because each node Ni on the specified path verifies only its own verifier Vi . Since
verifier Vi is an XOR result of several same-size messages (i.e., an authenticator Ai and a number i
of PoPs from all Ni ’s upstream nodes), an attacker does not have to forge every message to forge
Vi . The attacker only needs to forge a message with the same size as that of Vi via, say, random
guessing. The size of a verifier per ICING design is 42 bytes [46]. It renders the success probability
of a random guessing attack as negligible as 128×42 ≪ 0.0001.
4.3 OPT
Origin and Path Trace (OPT) [46], integrated in the SCION Internet architecture [11, 88], achieves
higher efficiency than ICING does, given a higher level of trust among on-path nodes. For example,
when the destination and all routers on an n-node path trust the source, OPT can enable them to
verify a packet by only O(1)MAC computations instead of the O(n)MAC computations required
by ICING. Consider again P = (N0,N1, ...,Ni , ...,Nn−1) as the path to enforce. Since all nodes Ni
(1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) trust the source N0, each Ni generates a shared symmetric key ki with N0 and sends
ki to N0. N0 initializes a Path Validation Field (PVF) as PVF0 in the packet header. Should each
downstream Ni update PVFi−1 by ki -keyed MAC, source N0 can be aware of all correct PVFi ’s if
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Fig. 3. OPT packet instance by rendering Figure 4 in [46]. Different from ICING, OPT does not include the
list of on-path nodes in a packet header. Instead, the source forwards the path information to on-path nodes
during they exchange keys. The source N0 precomputes PVF and OPVi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Ni validates the
packet by verifying whether OPVi can be derived by PVFi . If validation succeeds, Ni needs to update only
the PVF field with its proof of processing integrated.
the packet follows path P . Then for Ni to verify whether its received packet has visited N0 through
Ni−1 in the correct order, N0 can compute a shared secret with Ni using the correct PVFi−1 and
ki . OPT refers to such secret as Origin and Path Validation (OPV) and allocates one OPVi field for
each Ni in the packet header. Upon Ni receiving the packet, it employs the same method as N0 to
compute OPV′i using PVFi−1 carried in the packet and ki . Path validation succeeds if OPVi = OPV′i ,
costing Ni only O(1)MAC computation.
Figure 3 illustrates how OPT augments the packet header for path validation [46]. We focus on
the newly added OPT header. Before sending out an OPT packet, the source N0 should initialize all
OPT header fields with shared keys with the other on-path nodes. Upon a node Ni receiving the
packet, it first verifies whether the packet visits all its upstream nodes in the correct order. This
verification takes as input the OPT header fields of DataHash, SessionID, Timestamp, PVF, and
OPVi . If the packet passes verification, Ni only needs to update PVF before forwarding the packet
to Ni+1. We sketch the processes of initializing, verifying, and updating an OPT packet as follows.
Initialization on the source. The source N0 first initializes DataHash and SessionID of an OPT
header.
DataHash = H (Payload),
SessionID = H (PKσ | |PATHσ | |Tσ ),
where H (Payload) is hash of the packet’s payload, PKσ is the source’s public key together with
which there is a corresponding private key PK−1σ , PATHσ = (N0,N1, ...,Ni , ...,Nn−1) is the source-
selected path for packets to be transmitted in a session indexed by σ , andTσ denotes the time when
N0 initiates session σ . DataHash can be used to check packet integrity and compute OPV fields.
SessionID will be used for on-path nodes to generate shared keys with the source on the fly; these
keys ki are already collected by the source during the key steup phase. Timestamp records the time
when the source creates the packet; it prevents an attacker from replaying eavesdropped packets.
Based on the preceding three fields, the source N0 further initializes PVF and OSV fields as follows.
PVF = PVF0 = MACkn−1 (DataHash),
OPVi = MACki (PVFi−1 | |DataHash| |Ni−1 | |Timestamp),
where PVFi = MACki (PVFi−1). To make sure that PV Fi−1 must come from Ni−1 to pass verification,
the identifier Ni−1 is also included in the computation of OPVi . After initializing all OPT header
fields, the source N0 forwards the packet to the next hop N1.
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Verification on intermediate routers and the destination. Upon receiving the packet from
N ′i−1, Ni (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) performs path validation by verifying OPVi . Ni needs to derive its shared
key ki with the source on the fly as the following.
ki = PRFSi (SessionID),
where PRF is a pseudo-random function keyed with Ni ’s local secret Si . OPT chooses to generate
ki on the fly as this is faster than retrieving it from local cache or memory [46]. Then Ni computes
OPV ′i as the following.
OPV ′i = MACki (PVFi−1 | |DataHash| |N ′i−1 | |Timestamp).
If the resulting OPV ′i is equal to the OPVi carried in the packet header, path validation succeeds.
Otherwise, path validation fails and Ni may drop the packet.
Update on intermediate routers. If the packet passes path validation andNi is not the destination
yet, Ni should update the packet and send it to the next hop. OPT requires Ni to update only the
PVF as PVFi = MACki (PVFi−1). Different from ICING, OPT does not embed the source-selected
path in the packet header. Instead, the source sends PATHσ for session σ to on-path nodes during
shared-key initialization. Then each on-path node locally follows PATHσ to forward packets.
OPT further suggests how to maintain the O(1)MAC computation complexity when nodes do
not trust the source. A distrusting source may collude with router Ni to bypass all the routers in
between. Consider, for example, when the source N0 colludes with router N2 to bypass N1. Without
this bypass misbehavior being detected by Ni (3 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), N0 and N2 need manage to make
PVF still look as it would have been updated by the bypassed N1. This is easy for N0 because the
expected PVF for N1 is PVF1 = MACk1 (PVF0) and both inputs of k1 and PVF0 are known to N0.
The countermeasure against a distrusting source by OPT is introducing another PVFD for the
destination Nn−1 to verify [46]. To support PVFD verification, each router Ni should create a shared
key kDi with the destination. Ni then uses kDi to update PVFD . Since kDi is unknown to the source
N0, N0 can hardly forge PVFD . Under the enhanced OPT, each on-path node performs two MAC
computation over two PVFs.
From the enhanced OPT, we observe a subtle but key difference between OPT and ICING that
contributes to their efficiency gap. As previously mentioned, when the destination distrusts the
source, it creates one shared key with each of its upstream nodes. Then for the destination to verify
whether all the upstream nodes did really process the packet, each upstream node should perform
one more MAC computation for generating proof to the destination. Similarly, if each on-path node
needs to verify proofs from its upstream nodes without trusting the source, each on-path node has
to perform one MAC computation for each of its downstream nodes. This renders the number of
MAC computation per node by OPT identical to that by ICING, that is, O(n).
4.4 OSV
Orthogonal Sequence Verification (OSV) [18, 19] follows the same design principle as OPT [46]
but leverages orthogonal sequences instead of cryptographic computations toward faster path
validation. As shown in Figure 4, OSV also relies on a PVF field and an Original Validation (OV)
field per on-path node. Each node Ni needs to update PVF in a way known only to itself and the
source. The source can easily pre-compute expected PVFi upon a series of update by N0 through
Ni . Ni+1 can thus use PVFi as a proof of whether its received packet has visited N0 through Ni in
the correct order. To this end, the source pre-computes OVi+1 using a shared function with Ni+1
and takes PVFi as an input. Upon receiving the packet, Ni+1 first computes anOV ′i+1 using the PVF
(i.e., PVFi ) carried in the packet header. IfOV ′i+1 is equal toOVi+1 carried in the packet header, path
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Fig. 4. OSV packet instance by rendering Figure 4 in [19]. Path validation framework is similar to that of
OPT. But OSV adopts orthogonal sequences to yield faster computation of PVF and OV fields.
validation succeeds. The major difference herein from OPT is a much faster computation of PVF
and OVs based on orthogonal sequences is adopted. We sketch the OSV framework as follows.
Initialization on the source. The source first generates anm×m Hadamard matrixH that satisfies
HHT = mIm [8]. All distinct rows (or columns) of H contain elements of either 1 or −1 and are
mutually orthogonal in that for the result of inner product of any two rows (or columns) we have
hi · hj = 0. This motivates OSV to use vectors of H as on-path nodes’ credentials. Consider, for
example, when the source N0 chooses h0 as its credential and forwards h1 to N1 as N1’s credential.
Then N0 can simply carry h0 in the packet header. Upon verification, N1 conducts an inner product
computation over the carried h0 and its local h1. If the result is 0, N1 can choose to believe that the
packet does come from the correct source. OSV makes two necessary design choices to guarantee
security.
• First, the dimension of H should be large enough to avoid an attacker from forging valid
vectors by random guessing. One desirable property of a Hadamard matrix is that given
a fixed dimension, there might be many matrix instantiations. For example, a 32 × 32
Hadamard matrix can have up to 13,710,027 possible constructions [45] . But the downside
is once the source nails down a specificm×m matrix, there are up tom vectors in use. Once
all these vectors are used as credentials on various packets, the source has to generate a
new matrix and forward credentials selected therein to on-path nodes. To avoid overhead,
the source generates multiple matrices at the same time, providing more possible vectors
to use before the next round of matrix re-initialization. One or more vectors from each
matrix may be forwarded to each on-path node as its credentials. The matrix index field in
the packet header, as shown in Figure 4, indicates to a node which credential to use for
path validation.
• Second, vectors carried in packets should be obfuscated to avoid leaking credentials. For
example, instead of simply putting h0 in the packet header, the source N0 generates another
random sequence r0 and usesh0+r0 as PV F0. Then the source further setsOV1 = h1 ·PVF0 =
h1 · (h0 + r0) = h1 · r0. Upon path validation, N1 simply verifies whether h1 · PVF0 is equal
to OV1 as carried in the packet header without revealing h0.
Based on the above two design choices, the source initializes path validation credentials in a
packet header as follows. For credential computation, the source N0 first communicates with each
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on-path node Ni to setup a pair of shared keys {kN0 ,kNi }. N0 then generates a number of Hadamard
matrices. From eachm ×m Hadamard matricies, N0 choosesmi vectors and sends them to Ni as
its credentials. The restm0 =m −∑n−1i=1 mi vectors are used as N0’s credentials. N0 will use one of
these credentials after another for each of the packets to be sent. Consider, for example, N0 uses
hjN0 for the current packet. Then row index in the packet header is set as j while the matrix index is
set according to from which matrix hjN0 is selected. Credential c and PVF are initialized in the same
way as the following.
c = PVF = PVF0 = hjN0 + r
j
N0
= hjN0 + F (kN0 |j),
where F is a pseudorandom function for generating the pseudorandom sequence r jN0 . Note that F is
shared among all on-path nodes. To initializeOVi ,N0 first computes a series of PVFi ’s (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1)
as the following.
PVFi = PVFi−1 + hxNi + r
j
Ni
= PVFi−1 + hxNi + F (kNi |j)
= hjN0 + r
j
N0
+
i∑
i=1
(hxNi + F (kNi |j)),
where hxNi is the credential vector Ni will use to verify the packet. Following the design of OPT,
OSV sets OVi as follows.
OVi = hxNi · PVFi−1
= hxNi · (r
j
N0
+
i−1∑
i=1
F (kNi |j)).
The second line holds as the inner product of hxNi and any of its mutually orthogonal sequence h
x
Nj
yields zero. With the preceding fields initialized, the source N0 forwards the packet to N1.
Verification on intermediate routers and the destination. Upon Ni verifies the packet, it first
authenticates the source and then validates the path taken by the packet so far. Source authentication
aims to ensure that the packet does really come from the source that shares keys and credentials
for initializing the received packet. Specifically, source authentication verifies the field of credential
c and succeeds if given the matrix index, all Ni ’s credential vectors belonging to this matrix should
satisfy the following condition.
∀p (1 ≤ p ≤ mi ), hpNi · c = h
p
Ni
· F (kN0 |j).
If source validation succeeds, Ni proceeds with path validation, which succeeds if the following
condition is satisfied.
∃p (1 ≤ p ≤ mi ), hpNi · PVF = OVi .
Both condition verifications leverage the fact that the inner product result of two orthogonal
sequences is zero.
Update on intermediate routers. Before forwarding the verified packet to Ni+1, Ni needs to
update PVF as the following.
PVF = PVF + hpNi + F (kNi |j).
As with OPT, OSV does not include the path-node list in the packet header. The source-selected
path thus needs to know which on-path nodes it exchanges keys. Ni+1 then follows the preceding
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Fig. 5. Alibi Routing (Figure 1 in [48]). For source s to communicate with destination d without packets
going through a forbidden region F , a relay node r is selected and required to leave proof in the packets.
This proof should negate the possibility of the packet traversing the forbidden region F . To this end, a relay
should be sufficiently far from the forbidden region such that transiting both the forbidden region and the
relay induces a noticeable higher delay than transiting only the relay. Let R(x ,y) denote the end-to-end
latency between two nodes x and y. For any node f in the forbidden region F , the selected relay r should
satisfy that (a) R(s, r ) + R(r ,d) ≪ minf {R(s, f ) + R(f , r )} + R(r ,d) if the packet is from s to d , and (b)
R(d, r ) + R(r , s) ≪ minf {R(d, f ) + R(f , r )} + R(r , s) if the packet is from d to s .
verification for source authentication and path validation; if it is not the end of the path, Ni+1
further updates the packet and forwards it to the next hop Ni+2.
Although computation over orthogonal sequences is faster than cryptographic computation, we
observe that the OSV framework resembles OPT under the case of a trusting source. That is, all
verifier fields in the packet header can be pre-computed by the source. Other on-path nodes do
not share secrets among them. Then for any pair of nodes Ni and Nj (j > i) excluding the source,
Ni has no means to provide a non-forgeable proof of packet processing to Nj . This renders Nj
hard to guarantee whether a verified packet has visited all predecessor nodes in the correct order,
especially when it does not trust the source.
5 WHAT’S BEYOND: ALIBI ROUTING
Path validation solutions surveyed in Section 4 govern where packets should traverse rather than
where they should not. It may seem that the two types of governance are identical—Not traversing
a node can be achieved by specifying a path without the node included. This holds only when all
nodes behave in accordance with the specified forwarding process. But when a certain on-path
node misbehaves (Section 6.1), it may direct packets to a forbidden node that is supposed to be
avoided. The forbidden node might perform unwanted processing over packets. Then it forwards
these packets toward the destination or back to the misbehaving on-path node. If the latter is the
case and the forbidden node leaves no mark on packet headers, path validation solutions cannot
detect such deviation.
It is, therefore, necessary to design a path validation solution that generates proofs of packets
impossibly traversing through some node or region. To the best of our knowledge, Alibi Routing
[48], as illustrated in Figure 5, is the only solution for this. The idea is introducing a trusted relay
node r that is sufficiently distant from the forbidden region F . If a packet traverses through both
r and some node f in F , it would encounter a noticeably higher latency than when it traverses
through only r . Consider, for example, when the source s sends a packet to the destination d and
expects that the packet avoid the forbidden region F . A feasible relay r should satisfy the following
constraint.
R(s, r ) + R(r ,d) ≪ min
f ∈F
{R(s, f ) + R(f , r )} + R(r ,d)
⇔R(s, r ) ≪ min
f ∈F
{R(s, f ) + R(f , r )},
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where R(s, r ) denotes the end-to-end latency between s and r ; it is estimated using geographic
distance between two hosts [48]. Similarly, if the response from d to s still needs to avoid F , relay r
should also satisfy another constraint.
R(d, r ) + R(r , s) ≪ min
f ∈F
{R(d, f ) + R(f , r )} + R(r , s)
⇔R(d, r ) ≪ min
f ∈F
{R(d, f ) + R(f , r )}.
To avoid the forbidden region F , the source s needs to collaborate with nodes out of F to find
a feasible relay r . Source s first locally computes a target region T where a feasible relay r may
exist. For computation, F and T are modeled as a set of (latitude, longitude) pairs. Geometrically
speaking, F andT are polygons. Locations of F ’s borders would suffice for computingT based on the
preceding constraints. Borders of, for example, countries, can be found online with high precision
[1]. The source then sends a query message < s,d, F ,T > to one or some of its neighbors. Upon
receiving the query message, a node q continues with the search of a feasible relay by satisfying
safety and progress conditions. Safety requires that the query message be further forwarded to
a trusted next-hop neighbor n. That is, the next-hop neighbor n and at least one of its next-hop
neighbors should be outside the forbidden region. Given measured RTT—L(q,n)—between q and n
and estimated minimum possible RTT—ℓF (q)—between q and nodes in forbidden region F , a trusted
next-hop neighbor should satisfy the following constraint.
L(q,n) < ℓF (q).
Several next-hop neighbors ofqmay satisfy the preceding constraint. Forwarding the querymessage
to which of them should meet the other progress condition. Specifically, if q is not in the target
region T , the next-hop neighbor n it chooses must be closer to T . In contrast, if q is already in T , it
need also find a next-hop neighbor n that promises a lower end-to-end latency for the source and
the destination.
Alibi Routing can guarantee proof of avoidance from the forbidden region if the key used for the
relay to generate the proof is kept secret. We, however, observe that Alibi Routing fits better with
scenarios where nodes in the forbidden region intend to manipulate packets (e.g., drop or alter
them) rather than simply overhear. Because in such scenarios, once the destination receives a packet
signed by the relay, it can make sure that the packet is not affected by nodes in the forbidden region.
In some other scenarios where nodes in the forbidden region intend to infer certain privacy over
passing packets, Alibi Routing becomes vulnerable to attacks by compromised on-path nodes that
send copies of packets to the forbidden region, as also concerned in the original Alibi Routing design
[48]. Even for encrypted packets, traffic ascription and communication patterns may be inferred
[13, 49, 73]. This, however, is hard to prevent and concerned by most path validation solutions. We
will discuss more about this concern in Section 6.3, together with other underinvestigated aspects
of path validation in Section 6.
6 WHAT’S TO UNFOLD: OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, we discuss the limitations of current path validation protocols and explore feasible
countermeasures. The limitations lie mainly in three aspects: security, privacy, and efficiency.
• Security. Since path validation relies on cryptography, it is intrinsically resistant to various
security attacks such as forging and replay (Section 6.1). Most path validation protocols
(e.g., ICING [58], OSV [18, 19], and Alibi Routing [48]), however, demonstrate their security
properties by analysis. So far, only OPT [46] has a formal security proof [87]. We also
discuss two other security concerns in the literature. One is how to attest that an on-path
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node has correctly processed packets as expected (Section 6.2). The other is hidden-node
attacks in which some off-path node processes packets without leaving marks on them
(Section 6.3).
• Privacy. We find that there is a dilemma for path validation solutions to preserve path
privacy (Section 6.4). For a node to verify whether a packet has correctly visited upstream
hops, it should know the identities of these upstream nodes. On the other hand, for a node
to prove its packet processing history to its downstream nodes, it should know the identities
of these downstream nodes. Therefore, each on-path node is aware of the other on-path
nodes, making it hard to protect path privacy. Furthermore, the leak of path privacy reveals
end-host identities and thus prohibits anonymous communication.
• Efficiency. Although path validation solutions evolve with faster computation and shorter
states, they still cannot efficiently support agile forwarding like multipath routing (Sec-
tion 6.5). In multipath routing [55, 80], a packet is allowed to take one of multiple paths;
it may also switch among allowable paths during forwarding. It becomes prohibitively
inefficient to apply current path validation protocols to multipath routing given the likely
large number of possible paths. Specifically, dedicating an independent state for encoding
each path, concatenating states for all possible paths in a packet header may significantly
boost packet length. This may affect the efficiency of both packet processing and packet
forwarding.
6.1 Formal Security Proof
Security analyses of path validation protocols—ICING [58], OPT [46], and OSV [18, 19]—lack formal
proofs and heavily depend on arguing how a path validation protocol defends against common
attacks [87]. The major goal of such attacks is typically accompanied with more incentives to
fool path validation with packets carrying invalid secrets (e.g., forged or expired), rather than to
subvert path validation through, say, simply dropping packets on a compromised router and leaving
downstream routers with no packets to verify. We now review typical such attacks and their defeat
by path validation protocols.
Detour. A detour attack directs a packet either to an off-path router or to an on-path router in
an incorrect order. Consider, for example, a source-selected path ABCDE, where A and D are the
source and the destination, respectively, and B, C, and D are intermediate routers. In one case of
detour, a misbehaving/compromised node, say B, might forward a packet to an off-path node F to
evade packet inspection on C. Since the valid path ABCDE should be included in the packet header
[58] or informed to each on-path node before hand [46], either case enables the off-path node F to
determine the abnormality of receiving a packet that is not supposed to visit it. In the other case of
detour, the misbehaving/compromised node B forwards the packet to another on-path node, say D,
rather than the correct next-hop C. Whether D does or does not transmit the packet back to C, the
secret for D to verify lacks C’s proof in it and thus fails path validation.
Counterfeit. A counterfeit attack aims to forge valid secrets for detoured or injected packets.
When a detour attack skips on-path nodes, it is easily detected due to the lack of proofs from the
skipped nodes. A sophisticated attacker would thus need to forge the skipped proofs. This also
applies to injected packets that come from the attacker instead of the source. Injected packets
essentially resemble packets sent by the source, but altered by the attacker. For both types of
packets, the attacker aims to make them pass verification on on-path nodes and finally be accepted
by the destination. Since the attacker (i.e., compromised routers) does not have the keys used by
other nodes for proof generation, it heavily depends on random guessing to forge secrets. The
guessing probability decreases exponentially with proof length and can be negligible when proof
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length is reasonably large. Counter-intuitively, the attacker need not forge all on-path nodes’ proofs
to pass path validation. As we discussed in Section 4.2, the weakest link of path validation lies in the
destination. That is, if the attacker can successfully forge the proof corresponding to the destination,
the attack will succeed whether proofs of upstream nodes can be forged or not. This requires the
length of an individual proof field to be sufficiently large. For example, such a proof field by OPT
[46] accounts for 128 bits, limiting the probability of random guessing under 12128 ≪ 0.0001.
Replay. Given the difficulty of forging proofs, an attacker may simply record valid packets and
replay them later. Such a replay attack may jeopardize both the source and the destination. First,
replaying valid packets leads to more than actual traffic attributed to the source. If the packets
request certain accountable service from intermediate nodes or the destination, the source will be
charged more than supposed. Second, the destination must process replayed valid packets, suffering
from a potentially large waste of resources. A high-rate replaying attack thus can be exploited as
a DoS attack. All path validation protocols include countermeasures against replay attacks as a
key component. An intuitive idea is to let intermediate routers and the destination cache unique
metadata from each received packet, such as its carrying proof or counter. Upon receiving a packet,
a router or the destination first compares the packet’s metadata with the cached data. A match
found during the comparison reveals a replay attack. This idea is effective but impractical, due to
high storage overhead. A feasible enhancement is to divide the communication between the source
and the destination into sessions [46]. Within each session, all packets are embedded with the same
timestamp. Received packets with obsolete timestamps (e.g., from days ago) indicate replay attacks
and should be discarded. This way, routers and the destination only need to cache packets received
within several recent sessions.
Byzantine/Coward. A Byzantine attack on path validation is when misbehaving routers violate
path validation protocols only when they are less likely to be detected. For example, path validation
is invoked when forwarding anomalies such as large delay and packet loss occur, or when the
sender or destination has a new service requirement for packets to traverse a path different from the
default one. After forwarding anomalies are fixed or the new service is not applied to subsequent
traffic, path validation may be switched off from packet forwarding. This makes it hard to detect
misbehaviors of a sophisticated attacker (e.g., a compromised router) during the time path validation
is not applied. Byzantine attacks are also referred to as coward attacks [46]. In comparison with
the preceding attacks, coward attacks raise more challenges but attract less attention.
Both ICING [58] and OSV [18, 19] do not investigate countermeasures. We find this reasonable
if path validation is a prerequisite for packet forwarding. That is, every data packet should carry
path secrets and it can be accepted only if the secrets pass path validation. In other words, until all
on-path nodes generate and exchange necessary keys for verifying and updating path secrets, no
data packet is allowed to be transmitted. Note that we use the term “data packet” to differ from the
packets for exchanging keys during the setup phase.
An extended version of OPT mitigates coward attacks by removing the apparent key setup
process [46]. This way, routers no longer have a clear signal of when path validation takes effect. A
malicious node cannot determine when to behave normally per the path validation protocol and
when not to without being detected. This forces routers to perform consistently during packet
processing and forwarding. The extended OPT assumes that the source and destination trust each
other and have shared keys. In contrast, they do not need to exchange keys with intermediate
routers before sending packets. Since the source has no shared keys with intermediate routers,
it simply initializes PVF0 in the packet header without OSVs. Upon receiving the packet, each
intermediate router derives its shared key with the destination on the fly and updates PVF with the
derived key. The destination needs to cache received packets for a certain time duration, within
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which the destination can trigger path validation at any time. Upon a path validation request, each
intermediate router reveals the key it uses for updating PVF to the destination.
Although mitigating coward attacks, the extended OPT still requires routers to leave their proofs
for future verification. Since packets need to be cached on the destination until verification, they
impose a delay. In this sense, we suggest that following the original OPT but allowing no data packet
to be sent until successful key setup might be a faster choice, because it allows the destination to
instantly verify a received packet. Furthermore, requiring routers to leave proofs—with or without
the apparent key setup process—may alert routers of future verification. This renders the problem
tackled by OPT as a weak version of the coward attack. A more challenging version with path
validation either on or off would be an interesting research direction.
Collusion. Two or more compromised/malicious nodes on a path may collude to launch any of
the preceding attacks. Consider again a source-specified path ABCDE for example. B and D could
collude to skip C. Instead of verifying the packet, D may directly update the packet with its proof
and further forward it to E. E will easily detect this detour attack due to lack of C’s proof in the
packet header. One may wonder what happens when B, C, and D collude. For example, they could
skip C but still have C provide its proof. This trickier version of detour attack cannot be detected
by E. The intention behind such a collusion aims to make packets evade C’s processing but exhibit
as if they were processed by C. All path validation protocols consider this as unaddressable. We
will discuss it in Section 6.2 and suggest a countermeasure.
Unlike the common and more informal security analysis provided above, only OPT [46] is
backed up by formal security proofs [87]. As path validation relates to network protocols, its proof
should be applicable to arbitrary network topologies, and therefore raises more challenges than
proving cryptographic protocols [87]. Specifically, proofs in [87] focus on the version of OPT with
an untrusted source, that is, each router shares keys with both the source and the destination
(Section 4.3). Properties to prove include 1) secrecy and authenticity of the key setup phase, and
2) authenticity of origin/source and path of the packet during the forwarding phase. OPT is first
formally expressed using LS2 [28] that can reason about programs concurrently executing with
programs controlled by adversaries. Adversaries are interface-confined [30] to reasonably limit
their capabilities. Moreover, to reason about protocols using cryptographic functions, LS2 is further
extended with relevant definitions of data structures and axioms formalized by PCL [27]. Finally,
LS2-encoded OPT runs in Coq [2], a security proof assistance system that OPT uses to emulate an
adversarial environment. We refer interested readers to [87] for proof details. What we would like
to emphasize here is that the proofs of OPT focus on only the chained MAC technique. Proofs over
techniques like aggregated MACs by ICING [58] and orthogonal sequences by OSV [18, 19] remain
untouched and would be critical for deploying path validation as well.
6.2 Packet Processing Attestation
All path validation protocols acknowledge the incapability of verifying whether packet processing
takes effect [18, 19, 46, 58]. This concern is reasonable because a router adding its proof on a packet
does not guarantee that it faithfully processes the packet as requested. Consider, for example, a
router connecting to a middlebox for deep packet inspection. If compromised, the router may not
direct packets to the middlebox [16]. Even if the router behaves correctly, the middlebox may still
not inspect received packets as expected. In both cases, as long as the router adds its proof to
packets and sends them to the correct next hop, downstream routers and the destination cannot
detect these uninspected packets using path validation protocols. Attestation of packet processing
is imperative for strengthening path validation.
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We suggest a probing-based method to indirectly attest packet processing. The idea is to inject
probe packets along with production packets. Probe packets are constructed in such a way that
the expected result of processing them are known to the destination. Take a Firewall service for
example. When the source or the destination buys the Firewall service that filters unwanted traffic,
they need to verify that Firewall works correctly and faithfully. To this end, the source can send
a probe packet that must be filtered by Firewall. If the destination still receives the probe packet,
it detects an inaccurate or likely malicious behavior of Firewall. Knowing this detection method,
a sophisticated attacker manipulating the Firewall may normally process probe packets, while
still manipulating production packets. Therefore, probe packets should be indistinguishable from
production packets. Additionally, probe packets should carry random indicators synchronized
between the source and destination. Such indicators help the destination to identify probe packets
and discard them to avoid their impact on performance and security.
6.3 Hidden-Node Attack
If some nodes on the specified path are compromised, they might detour packets to some off-path
nodes, which perform unwanted inspection over the packets without leaving marks, and then direct
them back to the specified path. Consider, for example, a specified path N0N1N2N3. Compromised
N1 may detour packets to an off-path node Nx , which then directs packets back to N1. In another
case, if N2 is also compromised and colludes with N1, the off-path node Nx can direct packets back
to N2. This protocol breach is referred to as a hidden-node attack [58]. Hidden nodes correspond to
the off-path nodes. To avoid being noticed by end hosts, hidden nodes would not interfere with their
communication by, for example, altering or dropping traffic. Since hidden nodes do not leave marks
on packets, path validation protocols surveyed in Section 4 cannot detect hidden-node attacks. If
the hidden node is far away from the specified path and causes a noticeable transmission delay,
end hosts can use such a delay to detect hidden-node attacks. In this case, the detection method
resembles Alibi Routing [48]. However, if the hidden node is few hops away from compromised
on-path nodes, detouring packets through them would not cause too much delay. A slight delay is
hard to be differentiated from normal transmission-time fluctuation. This makes the detection of
hidden-node attacks very difficult.
A variation of hidden-node attacks do not detour packets through hidden nodes. Instead, compro-
mised on-path nodes simply copy packets and forward the copies to hidden nodes while forwarding
the original packets to the next hop on-path node [58]. Alibi Routing suggests that obfuscating
packets with anonymity techniques (e.g., Tor [74]) can make packet copies less useful to hidden
nodes and thus prevent privacy leakage.
Most path validation protocols consider hidden-node attacks hard to prevent and detect [46,
48, 58]. Their common advice is that the sender and the receiver should choose nodes they trust
enough to form the specified path. This way, on-path nodes are less likely to be compromised and
to detour packets or send copies to hidden nodes.
6.4 Host Anonymity and Path Privacy
Path validation cannot preserve anonymity and path privacy. End-host anonymity aims to protect
the identities of the source and the destination during their communication. End-host anonymity
implies the requirement of path privacy as well. If the path information is leaked, it is easier to
track down end hosts connected by the path. Therefore, anonymous communication protocols vary
packet formats per hop to prevent path privacy leakage by packet correlation. The typical protocols
for anonymous communication are built upon Onion Routing [75] or its evolved version Tor [74].
In such protocols, the source specifies a series of relay nodes that constitute an overlay network.
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After negotiating keys with each relay node, the source encrypts its messagem to the destination
using nested encryption. Consider, for example, source S and destination D communicate via three
relay nodes R1, R2, and R3. Let k1, k2, and k3 represent the keys used for S to communicate with
R1, R2, and R3, respectively. Then the encrypted message sent from S to R1 is constructed as the
following.
Enck1 (R2,Enck2 (R3,Enck3 (messaдe,D))).
Upon receiving the above encrypted message, R1 decrypts it and can only obtain the specification of
the next hop R2 and the encrypted message targeted at R2—Enck2 (R3,Enck3 (messaдe,D)). Similarly,
R2 forwards the encrypted message Enck3 (messaдe,D) to R3, which finally forwards the message
to D. (Note that the message should be encrypted with a key shared between S and D to protect
confidentiality.) For each relay node, all it can infer from the received encrypted message is its
previous hop and its next hop. Such inferred information is the minimum of any forwarding
protocol, and it is maximum revealed by Onion Routing. In other words, besides the first relay
node, the other relay nodes (e.g., R2 and R3) cannot know the source. This guarantees the source
anonymity. The destination anonymity can be protected in the same way. But path validation
protocols require that path information be revealed to on-path nodes through packet-carried states
(e.g., ICING [58]) or pre-loaded configuration (e.g., OPT [46]). If this is not the case, a node cannot
ensure packet-processing proofs of which previous hops it needs to verify.
6.5 Forwarding Agility
Current path validation protocols bind a packet with only one fixed path. Therefore, they cannot
efficiently apply to agile forwarding, which allows packets to switch paths during forwarding. Agile
forwarding is built on multipath routing. Unlike traditional routing protocols like BGP, multipath
routing computes multiple forwarding paths for each packet. There are two types of forwarding.
The first type selects one out of the multiple paths and forwards the packet along the selected path
[80]. This type of forwarding usually benefits traffic engineering such as congestion control and
load balancing. In this case, each packet is still coupled with one path during forwarding; existing
path validation protocols can be directly applied. More of our interest is the second type, which
allows on-path nodes to switch packets to another backup path [55]. It aims to improve forwarding
robustness through, for example, fast failover. A typical such multipath routing, Path Splicing
[55], organizes a packet’s multiple paths in a tree structure. The number of possible paths thus
may be exponential with path length, promising significant forwarding agility. However, it is hard
for current path validation protocols to encode such a huge set of paths as packet-carried states.
Finding practically efficient path encoding techniques is therefore imperative for path validation
under agile forwarding. How to find a tradeoff between forwarding agility and validation efficiency
would also be an encouraging research direction.
7 CONCLUSION
We have presented the first comprehensive survey of research on validating network paths. Due
to various limitations in agility, security, and privacy, traditional network architecture has long
been insufficient for fostering innovative Internet services. No matter whether the future Internet
follows a clean-slate or evolutionary design [66], validating network paths would be critical
for security [11]. Path validation strives for two enhancements over traditional packet delivery.
One is path enforcement, which enables routers to forward packets along paths specified by the
source, the destination, or intermediate routers. The other is path verification, which enables
intermediate routers and the destination to verify whether a packet has taken its specified path.
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Both enhancements introduce cryptographically protected states carried in packet headers. In a
nutshell, path validation requires that the source specifies in a packet header which routers the
packet should traverse in order. Routers then forward the packet according to this path directive.
Furthermore, the source and each router should embed in the packet header a series of proofs, one
for each downstream node (i.e., downstream routers and the destination). Such proofs allow a node
to verify path compliance. All these packet-carried states should be hard to forge or tamper. With
path validation, network entities can gain more control over packet delivery. A variant of path
validation can even enable end hosts to verify whether their packets detour from a certain region
[48].
Although ensuring higher service quality and security, path validation attracts only a small
body of work. We find that this rarity might be attributed to a long-standing confusion between
routing and forwarding. Routing aims to find paths for pairs of end hosts while forwarding aims
to direct packets from one end host to another. Compromised routers may make the forwarding
decision deviate from what is generated by the routing protocols. In other words, securing the
routing process alone cannot guarantee correct packet forwarding. It is also insufficient to merely
enforce packet delivery along a specified path, or to simply verify which path a packet has taken.
Path enforcement and path verification should be jointly adopted to accomplish path validation.
This strict requirement renders many routing and forwarding solutions unqualified for validating
network paths. Clearly, in order to satisfy both path enforcement and verification, the cryptographic
states carried in packet headers would be quite large in size. A major trend in path validation
design is therefore shortening the states. However, we find that the efficiency gain comes at the
cost of security degradation. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the properties and limitations
of existing path validation solutions. It reveals that they are still limited in various aspects, thus
opening a wide range of inspiring and exciting research directions to further advance security,
privacy, and efficiency.
We hope that this survey article benefits both the research and industry community with useful
references and directions for validating network paths. Together, we shall strive for a better Internet.
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